Commentary : has financial development made the world riskier? by Hyn Song Shin
It is a great privilege to participate in the symposium and to
comment on Raghu’s paper. Raghu has written a lucid, thoughtful,
and indeed, thought-provoking piece on an issue of great relevance to
central bankers.
The main theme running through Raghu’s paper is liquidity, but
you’ll have noticed that he is careful not to give a formal definition of
liquidity. This is understandable since liquidity defies a simple defini-
tion. But we know two things about liquidity:
• It has attributes of a public good,
• but it’s a public good that arises from the diversityof intended actions.
So, when I buy or sell, it is only by virtue of the fact that there are
other people doing the opposite that I am contributing to liquidity.
Just as with any other public good, a very natural question is whether
we can have market failure. Raghu’s diagnosis is that yes, on occasion,
this public good can give rise to market failure, and financial develop-
ment has, in some ways, made the problem worse. Unlike Don Kohn,
I have more sympathy with Raghu’s diagnosis.
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381For the sceptics among you, I’d like to tell you about the Millen-
nium Bridge in London. You may wonder why a bridge is relevant for
financial markets, but it turns out that the Millennium Bridge offers
a classic case study of market failure from engineering.
Many of you will be familiar with the Millennium Bridge. As the
name suggests, the bridge was built as part of the millennium celebra-
tions in the year 2000. It’s a pedestrian bridge that used an innovative
“lateral suspension” design, built without the tall supporting columns
that are more familiar with other suspension bridges. The vision was
of a “blade of light” across the Thames.
The bridge was opened by the queen on a sunny day in June, the
press was there in force, and many thousands of people turned up to
savor the occasion. However, within moments of the bridge’s
opening, it began to shake violently. The shaking was so severe that
many pedestrians clung on to the side rails. The BBC’s Web site has
some interesting video news clips, in case you’re interested. The
bridge was closed later on its opening day and was to remain closed
for more than 18 months.
When engineers used shaking machines to send vibrations through
the bridge, they found that horizontal shaking at 1 hertz (that is, at
one cycle per second) set off the wobble seen on the opening day. 
Now, this was an important clue, since normal walking pace is
around two strides per second, which means that we’re on our left
foot every second and on our right foot every second. And because
our legs are slightly apart, our body sways from side to side when we
walk. Those of you who have ever been on a rope bridge will need no
convincing from me.
But why should this be a problem? We all know that soldiers should
break step before they cross a bridge. And for thousands of pedestri-
ans walking at random, one person’s sway to the left should be
cancelled out by another’s sway to the right. If anything, the princi-
ple of diversification suggests that having lots of people on the bridge
is the best way of cancelling out the sideways forces on the bridge.
382 Hyun Song Shin
 Or, to put it another way, what is the probability that a thousand
people walking at random will end up walking exactly in step, and
remain in lock-step thereafter? It is tempting to say “close to zero.” After
all, if each person’s step is an independent event, then the probability of
everyone walking in step would be the product of many small
numbers—giving us a probability close to zero.
However, we have to take into account the way that people react to
their environment. Pedestrians on the bridge react to how the bridge
is moving. When the bridge moves from under your feet, it is a
natural reaction to adjust your stance to regain balance.
But here is the catch. When the bridge moves, everyone adjusts his or
her stance at the same time. This synchronized movement pushes the
bridge that the people are standing on, and makes the bridge move even
more. This, in turn, makes the people adjust their stance more drasti-
cally, and so on. In other words, the wobble of the bridge feeds on itself.
The wobble will continue and get stronger even though the initial
shock (say, a small gust of wind) has long passed.
The wobble results from shocks that are generated and amplified
within the system. It is very different from a shock that comes from a
storm or an earthquake, which come from outside the system. Stress
testing on the computer that looks only at storms, earthquakes, and
heavy loads on the bridge would regard the events on the opening day
as a “perfect storm.” But this is a perfect storm that is guaranteed to
come every day.
So, what does all this have to do with financial markets? Actually,
quite a lot. Financial markets are the supreme example of an environ-
ment where individuals react to what’s happening around them, and
where individuals’ actions affect the outcomes themselves. The pedes-
trians on the bridge are like banks adjusting their stance and the
movements of the bridge itself are like price changes. You want diver-
sity, but the market price is a lightning rod that imposes uniformity.
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 There have been many instances of failure of liquidity of this type.
Take the 1987 stock market crash for example. The Brady Commis-
sion highlighted practices such as portfolio insurance and dynamic
hedging in amplifying the price fall. As you know, dynamic hedging
attempts to position one’s portfolio in reaction to price changes in
order to mimic the payoffs from a put option. And since put options
pay out when prices are low, this means maintaining a short position
in the asset that becomes steeper as the price falls. In other words,
dynamic hedging dictates that when the price falls, you sell more of
the asset. This is a strategy that relies on liquid markets—on others
who will buy when you sell. When the price falls, dynamic hedging
dictates even larger sales. And as the market adage goes, one should
never try to catch a falling knife, and so potential buyers stand on the
sidelines until the knife drops to the ground.
We can all name many more episodes of market distress of this type
since the 1987 crash. The events of the summer 1998 are still fresh in
our minds.
Both the 1987 crash and the events of summer 1998, as serious as
they were, were restricted to small segments of the economy. Finan-
cial development has meant that the potential for feedback is now
much more pervasive. The advent of credit derivatives has brought
closer the prospect of marking bank loan books to market, so that the
galvanizing role of market prices soon will reach into every nook and
cranny of the financial system.
Even previously boring banks are now at the cutting edge of price-
sensitive incentive schemes and price-sensitive risk-management
systems. And mark-to-market accounting ensures that any price
change shows up immediately on the balance sheet. So, when the
bridge moves, banks adjust their stance more than they used to, and
marking to market ensures that they all do so at the same time.
The engineers for the Millennium Bridge found that there was a
critical threshold for the number of pedestrians on the bridge at
384 Hyun Song Shin
 which the wobble kicked in (160, as it happens). Below that thresh-
old, there were no outward signs of trouble.
As ever, engineers have the advantage over economists in being able
to conduct controlled experiments. For financial markets, it is very
difficult to ascertain what the tolerance threshold for maket liquidity
is, beyond which we see events such as the financial distress of
summer 1998.
But we know two things:
• Below the threshold, markets will function well, shocks are
absorbed, and volatility will be dampened as the market performs
its task.
• But beyond that threshold, all the elements that formed a virtu-
ous circle to promote stability now will conspire to undermine
it. There is a big difference between risk and volatility.
What we don’t know is where that threshold is. It is possible that
the threshold is so distant that we needn’t worry. On the other hand,
it would be safe to assume that the developments Raghu highlights
have moved us just a little closer to that threshold.
Now, let me turn to Raghu’s policy proposal. The engineers for the
Millennium Bridge decided to attach shock absorbers underneath the
bridge. For financial markets, this solution would be rather like increas-
ing market frictions so as to make trading more difficult—somewhat
like Tobin’s notion of throwing sand into the wheels of financial markets.
Raghu’s proposal for the regulation of incentives is an alternative
way to address the problem. I realize that my bridge analogy is already
creaking under the strain, but let me push it a little further.
Raghu’s proposal is intended to alter the way that banks react to
short-run price changes. It would be rather like giving pedestrians on
the bridge balancing frames (picture those baby walkers with wheels
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 on the side), so that they do not have to adjust their stance if the
bridge were to move from under their feet. If they do not react, then
the bridge will stabilize. 
For financial markets, Raghu is surely right that balancing frames
are far superior to shock absorbers. Indeed, Raghu himself has written
extensively on the benefits that we all reap from financial develop-
ment. Shock absorbers would be like throwing the baby out with the
bath water.
But I think Raghu himself would recognize that his proposal is a non-
starter, at least under current circumstances. There just isn’t the appetite
for this kind of reform. And there are many practical hurdles. Don has
mentioned some. Let me add a couple more. Lawyers will point out that
interfering in contractual arrangements between willing parties will not
be looked upon kindly by the courts. There are also competitive level-
playing-field considerations. Piecemeal implementation by one country
will succeed only in weakening one’s own financial industry.
But this sounds strangely familiar. Indeed, we have been here
before. The Basel Capital Accord of 1988 was precisely such an
attempt at collective de-escalation. The question is one of political
appetite. Or as Raghu might say, the appetite for reform will be a
matter of how severe the next crisis will be.
It is apt that Malcolm Knight is chairing this morning’s session,
because when the time comes, this will be a matter for a Bank for
International Settlements committee.
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